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ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

Thursday, May 18, 1978

U. S. House of Representatives,
John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D. C.

Deposition of:

ALAN B. WHITE

called for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee,
pursuant to notice, in the offices of House Annex II, Room
3370, Second and D Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C.,
beginning at 10:00 a.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a
Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were
present on behalf of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ., Staff Counsel

For the Deponent:

(There was no representation by counsel)

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P R O C E E D I N G S

Whereupon,

ALAN B. WHITE

having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Mr. Goldsmith. Please state your name and occupation for the record.

Mr. White. My name is Alan B. White. I am presently involved in real estate.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what state do you live, Mr. White?

Mr. White. In Virginia.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here voluntarily today and without subpoena?

Mr. White. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you received a copy of the Committee Rules and supporting resolution?

Mr. White. I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read Committee Rule Number 4?

Mr. White. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that rule?

Mr. White. Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand you have a right to counsel?

Mr. White. I do.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you waive that right?

2 Mr. White. I do.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. White, under the Committee Rules the
4 witness has a right to receive a copy of the deposition trans-
5 script. However, by virtue of the arrangement that the
6 Committee has worked out with the Central Intelligence Agency
7 in situations where we are interviewing present or former
8 Agency employees, I have been requested to ask those witnesses
9 to waive the right actually to receive a copy of the deposi-
10 tion statement. The waiver goes only to the right to receive
11 a copy. We would naturally give you full access to review
12 the copy and to evaluate it for accuracy, what have you, and
13 eventually to sign it and verify it.

14 Mr. White. That would be my only concern.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. You are willing to waive the right to
16 receive a copy?

17 Mr. White. To have it, yes.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. You are content simply to review it and
19 evaluate it for accuracy?

20 Mr. White. Yes.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read the letter
22 which is labeled J. F. K Document 96837?

23 Mr. White. Yes.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Let the record note that correspondence
25 with JFK Exhibit 94 used at the Committee hearings, a letter

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1 from acting DCIA to the Chairman of the Committee. Do you
2 understand that letter?

3 Mr. White. Yes, I do.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. The mandate of this Committee is to
5 investigate the assassination of the President, to determine
6 whether or not there was a conspiracy, to evaluate the per-
7 formance of the investigative agencies including the Bureau,
8 the CIA, and finally to evaluate the performance of the
9 Warren Commission. Do you understand that?

10 Mr. White. Yes.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had any discussion with any
12 present or former Agency employees in reference to testimony
13 that they may have given before this Committee?

14 Mr. White. No.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had any discussion or contact
16 with the Agency in reference to the testimony that you are
17 going to give here today?

18 Mr. White. Only as to my legal rights, not as to sub-
19 stance.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. White, where were you employed in
21 1963?

22 Mr. White. As of June 1963 I was Deputy Chief of the CIA
23 Station in Mexico City.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. How many years were you employed with the
25 CIA overall?

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1 Mr. White. From August 1946 until 31 July, 1976.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I did not catch the first date. August
3 of what year?

4 Mr. White. August 1946.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record I will state I am staff
6 counsel for the Committee and I am designated to take this
7 deposition.

8 What were your responsibilities as Deputy Chief of Station
9 in Mexico City?

10 Mr. White. My responsibilities were whatever the Chief
11 of Station decided to have me do. I would like to be more
12 specific than that but it was a very peculiar relationship.
13 I honestly cannot be more specific than that. I was required
14 to keep myself up to date to the extent I was permitted on
15 everything that was going on.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Did your work involved actually contact
17 with agents?

18 Mr. White. Yes, it did.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you work involve contact with the
20 various surveillance operations that the Agency had?

21 Mr. White. No direct, not direct, only through staff
22 personnel who were directly involved in it.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware of the nature of the
24 surveillance operations that were in effect?

25 Mr. White. Yes, I was.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the Station Chief in Mexico City?

2 Mr. White. Winston Scott.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you give us your evaluation as to
4 his competence as Station Chief?

5 Mr. White. He had been there for 13 years. He knew and
6 was known by anybody who was of any importance in Mexico. He
7 was left there by the Director for that length of time. I
8 assume he was thought to be highly competent.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What about the nature of the files
10 maintained by the Mexico City Station? Were they thorough?

11 Mr. White. They were incredible. They were exhaustive
12 and duplicative in every conceivable way.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. When you were in Mexico City did you know
14 Herbert Manell?

15 Mr. White. I did.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. What was his responsibility?

17 Mr. White. He was Chief of the Soviet Operations Section
18 at the station.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. What about David Phillips?

20 Mr. White. David Phillips was Chief of the CA Section,
21 Covert Action Section.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Phillips work at any time in
23 charge of the Cuban Operations?

24 Mr. White. In the latter part of his tour he was in
25 charge of Cuban Operations.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Bob Shaw?

2 Mr. White. Yes.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. What was his responsibility?

4 Mr. White. He was Chief of the Cuban Operations as well
5 subsequent to David Phillips' departure.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Ann Goodpasture?

7 Mr. White. I did.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. What were her responsibilities?

9 Mr. White. She was a Special Assistant to Win Scott and
10 her main responsibilities were to handle the surveillance
11 operations.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. By surveillance operations do you mean
13 both the wire tap and the photosurveillance operations?

14 Mr. White. Yes, I do. Principally the wire taps, how-
15 ever. She did not have -- well, she didn't have normal,
16 regular contact with the people in the photo operation.
17 That was handled out of the Soviet Section.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. When you say that she had responsibility
19 for the wiretap operations, was that for both the operations
20 against the Cuban and the Soviet Embassies?

21 Mr. White. Yes. That responsibility was shared, however.
22 She dealt with the outside contract agent, who worked with the
23 Mexican security representatives who were actually manning the
24 phone taps.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I have a document here which is referred

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1 to as CIA Document Number 170 which was prepared by Ann
2 Goodpasture. I would like to have you look at it where it
3 says "Unilateral photo Soviets." It lists Ann Good pasture,
4 alternate CO and internal routing. Does that in any way help
5 you remember what her responsibilities were with regard to the
6 photo operation?

7 Mr. White. I didn't arrive until June 1963. I don't
8 understand what this was. What was the purpose of these names?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Apparently Ms. Goodpasture was asked to
10 compile a list of people in the Mexico City Station and their
11 responsibilities. What you are looking at is that list.

12 Mr. White. I knew none of these people. If I knew them
13 at all I knew them by cryptonums or transcribers.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Please don't concern yourself with the
15 other individuals.

16 Mr. White. Okay, a list of unilateral photos, Soviets.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what Ms. Good pasture's
18 responsibilities were with regard to the photo operations?

19 Mr. White. As near as I can recollect she picked up the
20 film periodically from the agent who manned the photo.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. That was Mr. Sam Bernardi?

22 Mr. White. No. He was a station technician. There was
23 an automatic camera set up across the street from the entrance
24 to the Soviet Embassy. We had agents living in there whom I
25 knew only by crytonym. I am not sure whether she met those

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1 people directly or whether Bob Bernardi, who had been the
2 Station Technician and then resigned in Mexico, who lived with
3 his Mexican wife there, may have done the direct picking up
4 and then passed them to her.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. What about Thomas Keenan. Do you know what
6 his responsibilities were?

7 Mr. White. Tom Keenan mainly handled the outside sur-
8 veillance team. That was his principal responsibility. He
9 did help Annie with some of the pickup. To what degree, I
10 really don't know. But his main responsibility was running
11 the unilateral surveillance team.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. That was the unilateral surveillance team
13 with regard to the photographs?

14 Mr. White. No, it was for everything. It may have
15 included the photographs. This was a physical surveillance
16 team.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. For the record, I should say that is
18 consistent with the document which Ms. Good pasture prepared,
19 CIA Number 170 lists Mr. Thomas Keenan as being both with the
20 unilateral taps and with the unilateral photosurveillance.

21 How many different types of wiretap operations were in
22 effect in 1963.

23 Mr. White. Types?

24 Mr. Goldsmith. My understanding is that there was a
25 unilateral operation and a liaison operation.

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1 Mr. White. That is right.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any other operation?

3 Mr. White. Not telephone, to the best of my knowledge.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. What phones did you focus on in regard
5 to the unilateral operation?

6 Mr. White. The unilateral operations were -- they changed
7 all the time. The only one who determined what they would be
8 was Win Scott. I have to say again to the best of my recollec-
9 tion, that the unilateral taps were those that we felt we
10 could not discretely ask the Mexicans to do.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. The liaison operation was one that you
12 did jointly with the Mexicans?

13 Mr. White. Yes.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the liaison operation against
15 the Soviet Compound, do you recall how many phones were being
16 tapped?

17 Mr. White. You are only concerned with the Soviet target
18 now?

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. We will get to the Cuban later.

20 Mr. White. I honestly do not know numbers.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. What about the Cuban operation?

22 Mr. White. I can't give you numbers there either.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give some sort of an estimate?

24 Mr. White. My recollection is that there was a total of
25 30 lines at any one time and that half of those were given to

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1 the Mexican Government and the other half were reserved to us.
2 The ones that were reserved to us the product was shared with
3 the Mexicans on almost all of them. I think where it wasn't
4 shared it was because the Mexicans didn't want to receive it.
5 I can't put my hands in the fire for the fact that all the
6 Soviet or all the Cuban targets were on the joint tap. I think
7 some of them may have been on the unilateral tap. So, I would
8 have to say that there were probably more than -- well, the
9 Embassy itself, the Embassy phones were clearly joint.

10 Where home phones were tapped there may have been some
11 unilateral, some phones that we kept only for ourselves.
12 There were because anything that was on the unilateral system
13 we did not share with the Mexicans. I am trying to think how
14 many.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Specifically liaison taps against the
16 Cuban target?

17 Mr. White. It is a guess. Three or four maximum.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read CIA Number 160 through to
19 the end of the paragraph at the top of the page of CIA
20 Number 162 starting where it says "Liaison Coverage"?

21 Mr. White. May I ask what this document is?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly. That is an excerpt from the
23 Inspector General's report of 1977.

24 Mr. White. All right.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. My first question is, does that refresh

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1 your memory in any way as to the number of phones at the Cuban
2 Embassy that were being electronically tapped?

3 Mr. White. I see it says five. I would not have any
4 recollection of that because when we got the transcripts we
5 just got them in a batch and I never paid any attention to
6 what came from what phone. The mechanics of this thing were
7 not part of my responsibility.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. I want you to understand I was not ques-
9 tioning the accuracy of your earlier answer.

10 Mr. White. I got the 30 right anyway.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, you did. I was not making any repre-
12 sentation as to the accuracy of this particular document.

13 Mr. White. I can't fault any part of it as far as I can
14 see. There are a couple of subjective remarks about Mexican
15 officers about being brutal and corrupt but you can say that
16 about a lot of Mexicans.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. This paragraph here in CIA Number 161 says
18 that mid-1962 "The Mexican officer in charge of the LIENVOY
19 asked the American officer at LIENVOY listening post for the
20 telephone numbers of the Cuban and satellite Embassies in
21 anticipation of possible coverage. The station immediately
22 disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these
23 Embassies so that they would not be discovered when the
24 Mexicans hooked up their taps."

25 I am sure you understand that. Prior to mid-'62 was the

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liaison operation such that both the Mexican and the Americans were jointly tapping the Soviet, Cuban and satellite Embassies?

Mr. White. The implication here is that the Mexicans were not but wanted to. You see, this thing did not get started until apparently, according to this, until mid-1958. There are a lot of mechanical type bugs to work out of an operation of that sort before it begins to function properly. So, I have no reason to believe that the Mexicans were tapping. It was before my time there so I was only dimly aware of what we had been doing against the Soviets and satellites at that time.

That succession of events would have been logical because we kept our unilateral taps away from the Mexicans at all times.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would the station have been working on jointly with the Mexicans prior to 1962?

Mr. White. Probably communists.

Mr. Goldsmith. Individual persons?

Mr. White. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. As opposed to the Embassy Compound?

Mr. White. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What happened to the transcript that were made of the conversations that were the subject of electronic surveillance?

Mr. White. The transcripts came in several days after

1 the conversation took place. As I recall we got either the
2 following morning or the next morning -- I am sorry, the
3 morning after the conversation took place or two mornings
4 later we got a summary of what had been said, depending upon
5 the interest, and that summary was routed to specified officers
6 in the station. Not everybody saw everything, as far as I
7 know, other than the people who processed the material like
8 Ann Goodpasture and maybe in her absence Tom Keenan, the people
9 who saw it were section chiefs and myself and of course the
10 station chief. Anybody who wanted anything broken out further
11 would mark the passage, send a note to Annie or go to her
12 with it and say "get a complete transcription of this conver-
13 sation."

14 I always found the summaries ample for my purposes.
15 Since I was not working in detail with any of the operational
16 targets, since I had to kind of oversee all the operations
17 in the station it was seldom that I myself, asked to go back
18 for something. So to answer your question with regard to tran-
19 scriptions, what was done with them, I can only say that if
20 they were in Russian they would have to go back to Boris and
21 get him to run a complete transcription or if they were in
22 some other language we had a Polish-Czechoslovakian to break
23 it down.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. It would take a few days from the time
25 conversation came in until the transcript came to the station?

1 Mr. White. Yes.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Ann Good pasture the person who
3 brought the transcript to the station?

4 Mr. White. I think so. The reason I am hesitating is
5 because I keep thinking that somebody out of the Soviet
6 Section, I think it was Herb Manell's wife, who was handling
7 it, going back and forth with Tarasoff.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Ann Good Pasture acting in a super-
9 visory capacity with regard to the liaison operations?

✓ 10 Mr. White. That is very difficult to say. That is very
11 difficult to say. She carried with her a lot of invisible
12 authority that devolved upon her because of her operational
13 relationship with the Chief of Station, who had absolute
14 confidence in her. She had a marvelous memory. She was
15 meticulous in detail. I think he had every reason to put
16 that kind of trust in her

17 She reported directly to him. While she may not have
18 been invested with any command authority by virtue of her
19 position at the station, certainly she was a kind of unofficial
20 deputy for the purposes of the operations that she was involved
21 in.

22 For example, we had this old ex-FBI guy on the outside
23 who worked with the Mexicans with the taps. When Ann spoke
24 to George Monroe and said something to him George knew damn
25 well it had the backing of the Chief of Station. If he didn't

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1 he could go around and check it out. By and large there wasn't
2 much question in George's mind that when Annie said "The
3 boss wants this", that it came from Win. To that extent she
4 has supervisory responsibility.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. It was more of an unofficial type respon-
6 sibility?

7 Mr. White. Yes. She was not in the hierarchy, let me
8 put it that way. Does that make it clear?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

10 Mr. White. Okay.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. When the transcripts came in who would
12 be the first person that they would be sent to?

13 Mr. White. Scott.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Then Scott would route them to the
15 respective sections?

16 Mr. White. Yes. They came in in two or three copies,
17 I believe. She would send them directly to him and he would
18 underline them for indexing. It did not matter how many times
19 the name appeared it was underlined for indexing. That is
20 why we had a room the size of the building for a card file.

21 Anyway, the other copy was then routed around to me and
22 to the various sections chiefs.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. After you people had reviewed these
24 copies the transcripts would be stored?

25 Mr. White. Yes.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. At the Mexico City Station?

2 Mr. White. Yes.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Would the transcripts be sent to
4 headquarters?

5 Mr. White. When you are talking transcripts, I am
6 talking summaries. We seldom saw transcripts. When I say
7 we, I seldom saw transcripts. I know some of the section
8 chiefs did. People working on the Soviet target would call
9 for transcripts occasionally and I have seen them from time to
10 time. But usually they were asked for in order to get the
11 flavor of a total conversation or to attempt to see if there
12 was any substance to something that the summary had alluded
13 to.

14 More often than not they were then either filed or
15 destroyed. If they were thought to be of significance they
16 were sent home to Washington. My feeling is that by and large
17 we did not clutter up the mails back to Washington with a lot
18 of the detailed transcriptions.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Were most of the transcriptions summarized
20 and stored in Mexico City?

21 Mr. White. The summaries were, yes.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. What about the transcripts? Do you know
23 about them?

24 Mr. White. No. I would have to defer to each section
25 chief on that.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether there was any coordi-
2 nation between the wiretap operation and the photosurveillance
3 operation so that if, for example, one of the persons monitor-
4 ing the wiretap came across an interesting conversation he
5 could in some way apprise the photosurveillance people that a
6 particular individual might be coming to the Embassy?

7 Mr. White. To the best of my knowledge it was not. The
8 wiretap operation was conducted by a mexican and the photo-
9 surveillance was conducted as a unilateral operation. Anything
10 coming from the tap operation would have to come back from
11 the station and any directions would then have to go out --

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I am not suggesting that would have been
13 direct contact between the two.

14 Mr. White. Coordination certainly at the station end.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. So the wiretap people would contact some-
16 one at the station whose responsibility it would then be to
17 contact in some way the photosurveillance people?

18 Mr. White. Well, they didn't have to because the wiretap
19 people themselves were mechanics. All they did was process the
20 stuff. Now, that is not to say that maybe a conversation of
21 interest wasn't flagged from time to time. In the main, the
22 interpretation of what was said was the job of the case officer
23 around the station who then would coordinate on directions to
24 the photographer.

25 By and large the camera was pretty much automatic. The

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1 principal thing they would have to do would be maybe to pick
2 up more often than usual if they were interested in a visit
3 that was signaled in a telephone call.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying that there wasn't any
5 procedure for the persons manning the liaison operation if
6 they came across a conversation that was particularly signifi-
7 cant, you are saying there was not procedure for them immed-
8 iately to contact someone at the station to appose the photo-
9 surveillance people of the fact that someone of interest might
10 be coming?

11 Mr. White. No, I couldn't say that because that would be
12 saying more than I know. I don't know that there was or was
13 not. I assume there were means of emergency contact but I
14 never got involved in that.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the people at the wiretap operation
16 even know that there was a photosurveillance operation?

17 Mr. White. Not to the best of my knowledge. Not to the
18 best of my knowledge. They certainly shouldn't have.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether at the time of the
20 assassination the Mexico City station had a tape recording of
21 Oswald's voice?

22 Mr. White. At the time of the assassination?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

24 Mr. White. I do not.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. You don't know one way or the other?

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1 Mr. White. I do not. no. I tell you my problem frankly
2 is, and is one that I have always had a problem with, is
3 remembering things in the sequence that they occurred.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if the station ever had a tape
5 recording of Oswald's voice?

6 Mr. White. There was a conversation that was picked up
7 -- I don't remember which tap it was now, I guess it was the
8 joint tap -- which referred to Oswald. My recollection is that
9 it was him talking to the Soviets and trying to make an
10 appointment with them.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. We will show you those transcripts later
12 on. How long would a tap routinely be retained?

13 Mr. White. The tapes themselves?

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

15 Mr. White. I don't know that there was any routine figure
16 because we were always in need of tapes. There was always a
17 lot of pressure. Although these things were voice activated
18 they were running all the time. The machines were running 24
19 hours a day. So there was always a great deal of need for
20 tapes.

21 So as soon as they were judged to be no longer needed they
22 were erased and put back into the center again. I don't know,
23 two or three weeks maximum, I would say. By that time cer-
24 tainly one would know whether in most cases the conversations
25 were needed or the tapes were needed to back up the transcripts.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever listening to tape
2 recordings of Oswald's voice?

3 Mr. White. I do not. Did I ever?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. My record does not indicate one way or
5 another.

6 I would like you now to look at CIA Number 197, the
7 second paragraph.

8 Mr. White. Yes sir. This then is the second call?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. We will go over the transcript later on.
10 Please don't worry about that.

11 Mr. White. I was just trying to understand the paragraph.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. The question I have with regard to the
13 second paragraph is does this suggest to you that at the time
14 of the assassination the station still had one tape recording
15 of Oswald's voice or what they thought to be Oswald's voice?

16 Mr. White. This one, maybe.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. You say this one, you are referring to
18 the conversation of September 28?

19 Mr. White. This whole thing is 28 September, that is
20 right.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. That is right. I should point out for
22 your information that was actually the third call that has been
23 attributed to Oswald.

24 Mr. White. I don't know what the second call was.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. There were a total of four calls, at least

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1 four calls, at least four calls any way. The question I have
2 for you is in regard to the second paragraph. By the way
3 that paragraph is phrased does it suggest to you that at the
4 time of the assassination the station still had one tape of
5 Oswald's voice? In other words, that particular paragraph
6 does not say that all tapes of Oswald's voice have been erased?
7 All the phone calls with Oswald's voice recorded came in
8 between September 27th and October 1st.

9 Mr. White. At the time of the assassination there was
10 still one recording with Oswald's voice on it is your question?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

12 Mr. White. I couldn't get that out of this paragraph. I
13 could not get that out of this paragraph. I don't know who
14 wrote that cable.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Ann Goodpasture.

16 Mr. White. I was going to say it sounds like Annie
17 Goodpasture cable.

18 I would not get that out of that paragraph necessarily.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA Number 208. Will you
20 read paragraph 4?

21 Mr. White. That is Tarasoff, isn't it?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Does that suggest to you that after
23 the assassination Tarasoff did a voice comparison?

24 Mr. White. Not necessarily because he was kind of a
25 legend in the station because of his -- he had been listening
to that tap for so long that he had what officers in the

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2 Soviet Branch continually told me was a marvelous gift for
3 being able to analyze the voices. He had a fantastic memory
4 for the voices that he heard over those lines, or he heard on
5 those tapes, I should say. It would not surprise me at all
6 that he could say that from memory.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning now to the photosurveillance
8 operation against the Cuban target, do you know what the scope
9 of the coverage was in terms of time? How many hours per day
10 were they taking pictures of the Cuban target?

11 Mr. White. I don't think I ever knew that. I don't
12 think I ever knew that.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. How many years did you work in Mexico
14 City?

15 Mr. White. Four. The usual practice was to start coverage
16 from the time the consulate target being covered opened until
17 the time it closed. I am not sure about the camera in the
18 Cuban Embassy but in the Soviets Embassy that I was more
19 familiar with --

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us talk about the Cuban first and
21 then we will get to the Russian one.

22 Mr. White. I can't answer the question. I am not even
23 sure there was a photo operation against the Cuban Embassy at
24 that time.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. What is your best recollection when there

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1 was a photo operation against the Cubans?

2 Mr. White. That is right, there was one, but I can't
3 tell you the hours, I am sorry.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. What about with regard to the Soviet
5 target? What were the hours of that photo operation?

6 Mr. White. From the time their office opened, which was
7 about 10 o'clock in the morning, until it closed. They
8 varied their closing times from 2 to 4 in the afternoon.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there weekend coverage?

10 Mr. White. Normally not.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

12 Mr. White. Because there was no traffic in and out of
13 the Embassy.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the purpose of the photosurveil-
15 lance operation? By that I mean what targets were you trying
16 to obtain pictures of?

17 Mr. White. Persons of operational interest who would
18 visit the Soviet Embassy really, regardless of nationality.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that those individuals
20 would visit the Embassy on a weekend?

21 Mr. White. It is possible that they might have. This
22 decision was made before my arrival down there and was based
23 on a considerable experience of almost total inactivity on
24 weekends. So any weekend coverage would have been pretty
25 unimpressive I think. Most meetings I think were conducted

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1 with individual officers, either at their homes or meeting
2 places around the city.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. How thorough was the coverage when the
4 camera was in operation?

5 Mr. White. Allowing for minor outages, as you always
6 suffer in those mechanical operations, it was pretty thorough
7 during the working hours.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how long it took for the
9 photograph to arrive at the station? In other words, from
10 the time the picture was taken, how many days would it take
11 for it to arrive at the station?

12 Mr. White. Film, I think the photographs were processed
13 in the station, I am not sure. I think it was about every
14 three days. It depended on the traffic in the Embassy because
15 when the film was used up then a meeting would be set up.
16 There were also normal routine pickup types which I think were
17 twice a week, I am not sure.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Did they ever adopt the practice of send-
19 ing the film to the station at the end of every working day?
20 to cut down on the delay time?

21 Mr. White. I can't say for sure but it would not surprise
22 me after the assassination if that had been done for a while.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. But before the assassination?

24 Mr. White. I don't believe so. That could have been
25 arranged at the behest of either the station chief or the chief

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1 of facility section.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station ever obtain
3 a photograph of Oswald?

4 Mr. White. Through that operation?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Through any surveillance operation?

6 Mr. White. Not that I know of.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether a woman named
8 Charlotte Bustos ever found a photograph of Oswald at CIA
9 headquarters?

10 Mr. White. I know Charlotte Bustos but I don't know what
11 she was in CIA for. She was up there and I was in Mexico.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. You never heard a story after the assassi-
13 nation she was looking for a file at headquarters and found a
14 photograph of Oswald that had been taken by the surveillance
15 operation in Mexico City?

16 Mr. White. I never heard that story, no.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the procedure for contact-
18 ing headquarters with information? In other words, how is
19 information communicated to headquarters?

20 Mr. White. By cable or by dispatch.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the criterion deciding
22 whether to send something by cable or dispatch?

23 Mr. White. The normal criterion would be the urgency
24 attached to that information, the perishability of the infor-
25 mation, not its importance necessarily. The perishability

1 was the criterion.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean by perishability?

3 Mr. White. If it was something that concerned an event
4 that was going to happen in the next two or three days you did
5 not want to use a medium which was going to take a week to get
6 to Washington.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Then you would send a cable?

8 Mr. White. Sure.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. When did the name Lee Harvey Oswald first
10 come to your attention?

11 Mr. White. Obviously during this cable exchange sometime
12 but I can't give you a date. I can't relate it to a particular
13 date.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Oswald's contact at the Embassies
15 in Mexico City considered to be important?

16 Mr. White. At the time it first occurred?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

18 Mr. White. I would have to conclude that it wasn't
19 recognized as anything extraordinary at the time it first
20 occurred.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you conclude that?

22 Mr. White. Because had it been, it would have been pulled
23 out and sent to Washington either with a complete transcription,
24 a complete excerpt out of the transcription, or the entire tape
25 and transcript would have been sent to Washington by the first

1 available pouch, probably by special courier.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Does the fact that Mexico City station
3 sent to headquarters a cable reporting Oswald's contact
4 suggest that the station considered the contact to be important?

5 Mr. White. I can't remem-er when that cable was.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at that now.

7 Mr. White. If that was before the assassination or after.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at that cable now.

9 Mr. White. All right.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Please read CIA Number 178.

11 Mr. White. You are asking what is the significance of
12 the cable?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

14 Mr. White. Well, operational, that is all. Her is an
15 American citizen, at least a man who appeared to be an American
16 citizen, speaking broken Russian and in contact with the
17 Embassy. This is of operational interest. This is the kind
18 of information that we were directed among others, to get back
19 to Washington because they passed htat kidn of thing to the
20 Bureau.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Were contacts by Americans with the Soviet
22 Embassy considered to be unusual?

23 Mr. White. Well, we were 1963 then. They were considered
24 worthy of note, let me put it that way. Of course, from an
25 operational point of view we were looking for any way we could

1 exploit a contact with the Soviet Embassy.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Were such contacts by Americans frequent?

3 Mr. White. Not terribly frequent. Not terribly frequent.

4 There were members of the American exile colony in Mexico City
5 who were in kind of routine contact with the Soviets, usually
6 on cultural matters. No, I would say they were relatively
7 infrequent. That is why --

8 Mr. Goldsmith. -- the cable was sent?

9 Mr. White. Yes.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. I realize that the cable does not say that
11 is a photograph of the person mentioned in paragraph 1 but
12 the cable suggests that this may be a photograph of the person
13 mentioned in paragraph 1?

14 Mr. White. Yes.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how that photograph was linked
16 to the person mentioned?

17 Mr. White. By date. It was taken entering the Soviet
18 Embassy and leaving on the same date this conversation took
19 place. I remember that proceeding because we were combing through
20 through the takes of that day to determine any person who
21 looked like an American male. I believe this was the only one.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. So the first paragraph indicates there
23 was a telephone conversation?

24 Mr. White. Yes.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. And by virtue of that reference to the

1 telephone conversation you would have gone to look for the
2 photograph on October 1st?

3 Mr. White. Yes.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you at that time look through the
5 photograph take from other days, in other words, before and
6 after October 1st?

7 Mr. White. I didn't I couldn't say.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you involved at all in looking
9 for this particular photograph?

10 Mr. White. No. I was involved in looking at it once
11 that had been isolated.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. You just said you could recall the pro-
13 ceeding where there was a search for this photograph?

14 Mr. White. Yes, I do remember that and of course later
15 events made that time stand out a lot more.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Who were the people involved in the review
17 of the photograph take, trying to find a photograph of Oswald?

18 Mr. White. Bear in mind this is the date of 8 October.
19 This was perfectly routine, nothing to get excited about on
20 that day. Here is an apparent American, fine. Now it becomes
21 a little bit of an exercise, a little bit of a game to see if
22 we can match a photograph with that telephone call. That is
23 all it was.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

25 Mr. White. The person involved would have been the

1 analyst, probably the analyst of the Soviet Section of which
2 Herbert Manell's wife was one.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Anyone else?

4 Mr. White. I can't remember whether Cynthia Houseman was
5 there at that time. I don't think she was there at that time.
6 I don't think she had come yet. I know she hadn't. Herb
7 and his wife and one young male case officer. That would have
8 been it.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it your testimony that you think this
10 photograph was selected because on that day that was the
11 only individual who could be identified as an American?

12 Mr. White. Who appeared to be an American. I don't know
13 what time the telephone conversation was. But the time of the
14 telephone conversation may have had something to do with the
15 eliminating other possible American appearing people on
16 photographs that day. I don't remember whether there were.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. The timing of the conversation would not
18 have anything to do really with the time that persons were
19 were at the Embassy, especially since the conversation did not
20 say "I am coming over."

21 Mr. White. No, the conversation did not say he was coming
22 over, so let us scratch that qualification.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Will you take a look now at CIA Number
24 177 which is the headquarters copy of that cable? I have one
25 question about that document. I am pointing to where someone

1 wrote in D: 200-5-41. Do you know what that means?

2 Mr. White. That is the file reference. That is where
3 it was to be filed.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. To which type of file does that refer?

5 Mr. White. That is the subject file, 200-5 but I don't
6 know, I never dealt with the Mexico Desk files at headquarters.
7 So I don't know how they broke that down.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us examine some of these transcripts
9 now. Will you please read CIA Number 13, which is a tran-
10 script of a conversation that took place on October 1, 1963.

11 Mr. White. Okay.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. When was the first time that you saw this
13 transcript, if you have ever seen it before?

14 Mr. White. I don't know. I really don't know.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall if you saw this transcript
16 before the assassination?

17 Mr. White. I could have, I could have but not necessarily.
18 If I did it was just part of my routine reading. Some days I
19 had time to read this stuff, somedays I didn't.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this transcript was
21 the one which prompted the cable to be sent to headquarters
22 supporting Oswald's contact with the Soviets?

23 Mr. White. That first cable we saw was 1 October?

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. The cable was dated 8 October but
25 it referred to a contact on 1 October.

1 Mr. White. Very likely.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, in this cable the transcriber
3 indicates the same person phoned a day or so ago and spoke
4 in broken Russian. Then the person identified as Oswald says
5 "I was here last Saturday at your place." Do you recall whether
6 upon reviewing this transcript and checking the photo produc-
7 tion take whether the individuals doing that check went back
8 as far as the preceding Saturday?

9 Mr. White. I would have to assume that they did. As I
10 said, I don't think there was any photo coverage on the week-
11 ends. Have you found photo coverage on weekends? Am I wrong
12 about that?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. I really can't answer that. The Committee
14 rules prohibit me from discussing that kind of matter.

15 Now, will you please read CIA Numbers 14 and 15?

16 Mr. White. Okay. What is the question?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you read 15 also?

18 Mr. White. No.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the transcription.

20 Mr. White. All right.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever seen that transcript before,
22 the transcript from the conversation involving Oswald?
23 Although Oswald is not identified by name it was linked to
24 Oswald, and the date of it is September 28, 1963.

25 Mr. White. I very likely have.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when this transcript was
2 linked to Oswald? By that I mean do you know if it was linked
3 to Oswald prior to the assassination?

4 Mr. White. I do not know that, no. I wouldn't know it
5 because it wouldn't have had any significance in the station
6 before the assassination except perhaps in an operational
7 context or counterintelligence context when they were trying
8 to find out who this guy was.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. I have the same question for you in regard
10 to two other transcripts. They appear starting on CIA Number
11 16 through the CIA Number 18. Please read them and my question
12 is have you seen them before and when were the transcripts
13 linked to Oswald?

14 Mr. White. All right. You asked the same question?

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

16 Mr. White. I don't know when that first came to my
17 attention. Undoubtedly after the assassmination. I would not
18 have formally concerned myself with this in a routine operation.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know at what point your subordinates
20 would have linked those conversations to Oswald?

21 Mr. White. At what point they would have linked?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, prior to the assassination
23 or after the assassination?

24 Mr. White. They were very bright people. I assume they
25 would have had Oswald at least as one possibility and probably

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1 the most likely possibility as being the speaker to whom
2 Sylvia Duran was referring in her conversation with the Soviets.
3 So, probably before the assassination.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have personal knowledge prior to
5 the assassination that Oswald had been to both the Cuban and
6 the Russians Embassies?

7 Mr. White. I don't think so. Unless I read this conver-
8 sation but, as I said, it would not have registered on me.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA Number 183.
10 Would you please read that cable?

11 Mr. White. Yes sir.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. When would Win Scott have put those
13 marginal notations in?

14 Mr. White. As he read it probably.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, turning to the marginal notation on
16 the left where it says "sic" and underlines and points to the
17 word Henry. Do you know why Win Scott would have written "sic"
18 Henry Oswald?

19 Mr. White. If that is what that is. Is it "sic"?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. I do not want to influence you one way or
21 another. We have had testimony previously that that is "sic".

22 Mr. White. Then it may well be.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. The term "sic" is commonly used to point
24 out that there is a error made.

25 Mr. White. It would have had to have been after the

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1 assassination or after it became apparent that the person we
2 were all interested in was Lee Harvey Oswald. I say that
3 because it is perfectly logical to me because Win had the
4 files right on his desk everyday for the Oswald investigation.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. This is after the assassination?

6 Mr. White. Yes, after the assassination. He would have
7 been perusing them continuously.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this paragraph contains a more
9 accurate description -- I am pointing to the first paragraph,
10 -- contains a more accurate description of Oswald, does it
11 not?

12 Mr. White. Than what?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Than the description contained in the
14 cable 8 October from the Mexico City station to headquarters?

15 Mr. White. Because they were not the same guy. This
16 was Oswald and the other guy wasn't.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Once this cable was received was the
18 station aware that the person they had referred to in the first
19 cable was in all likelihood not Oswald?

20 Mr. White. I think so. I would think so. I have to
21 repeat again at this point in time this guy was nothing other
22 than of routine counterintelligence interest, you see.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. Would you read paragraph
24 five?

25 Mr. White. I did.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. It asks for further information to be
2 sent to headquarters reporting any contact for positive
3 identification. Do you know if the Mexico City station ever
4 sent any additional information to headquarters on Oswald?
5 For example, did they ever indicate to headquarters that
6 Oswald had been to the Cuban Embassy as well as to the Soviet
7 Embassy and that he wanted a visa?

8 Mr. White. I would have to assume that they did. I
9 realize that "assume" is a bad word.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. You don't have personal knowledge one way
11 or another?

12 Mr. White. No, prior to the assassination I would not.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. CIA Number 181 is the headquarters copy
14 of the 1/10 cable from headquarters to Mexico City which
15 was just reviewed. I note in the bottom left hand corner that
16 Thomas Karamessines was releasing officer. Why would someone
17 that high in the organization be the releasing officer on a
18 cable like this?

19 Mr. White. Can I read the first page?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly.

21 Mr. White. The reason would have been -- I don't know
22 what the ground rules at the DDO level were at that time but
23 the reason would have been in all likelihood that any cable
24 concerning the attention to coverage of an American overseas
25 would require the knowledge and approval of the DDP.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the reason for that?

2 Mr. White. The question of CIA involvement on the
3 coverage of Americans. This was a very goosey matter, even
4 then. As you can see it involved coordination with the FBI and
5 State and Immigration and so forth.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question. Why would
7 this information have been passed along to these many agencies?
8 In other words, why was the dissemination so wide?

9 Mr. White. You would have to ask Tomm Karamessines.
10 I can't answer that question. That depends on agreements that
11 were valid at the time between agencies. I would have no
12 knowledge of that.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. After the Mexico City station received
14 the cable from headquarters which gave the background on
15 Oswald and indicated that Oswald had been a defector to the
16 Soviet Union, to your knowledge did that in any way enhance
17 the importances of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy?

18 Mr. White. Oh, yes, sure, it did. The fact that he had
19 that kind of background. Sure, he became someone of con-
20 siderable operational interest. Again, there was nothing
21 other than operational interest.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. In all likelihood that cable would have
23 prompted the people at the station to go back and look at the
24 earlier transcript?

25 Mr. White. Yes, I would think so.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. And also to look for the photograph?

2 Mr. White. I would think so.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether prior to the assassi-
4 nation there was any additional action by the Mexico City
5 station in reference to the Oswald case?

6 Mr. White. Other than analytical action and probably
7 reviewing files to determine whether there was anything else
8 that they might dig out on him and tie to him as a result of
9 those phone calls. I am not aware -- I really couldn't say.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. If Oswald had been an agent of the KGB,
11 would headquarters have notified you of that?

12 Mr. White. If they had known it they certainly would
13 have. You don't normally expect an agent of the KGB to be
14 turning up in broad daylight at the main gate of the Embassy
15 or telephoning around town.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. If Oswald had been an agent of the CIA,
17 hypothetically now, would the cable from headquarters have
18 indicated that to you?

19 Mr. White. Well, we would like to hope it would have
20 but it needn't necessarily have.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. They might have let the Mexico City
22 station just proceed to evaluate and analyze the Oswald case
23 without giving them that information?

24 Mr. White. That is always a possibility in the intelli-
25 gence world. The principal need to know applies pretty widely,

1 you know.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination what was the
3 scene in Mexico City? By that I mean what was the atmosphere?

4 Mr. White. Crisis. The effort to run down clues on the
5 Oswald thing took priority over anything else.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. How many people were sending cables back
7 and forth between the station and headquarters?

8 Mr. White. Well, the Cuban Section was originating
9 cables concerning Cuban involvement. The Soviet Section was
10 sending cables concerning the Soviet involvement. Win Scott
11 was sending back "think" pieces.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. What is "think" pieces?

13 Mr. White. His own analysis of what probably happened.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever see any of those think
15 pieces?

16 Mr. White. I probably did. I say this was happening.
17 It was typical of the kind of thing that happens. All I am
18 saying is that anybody who had a piece of the pie was origi-
19 nating traffic on it. They all funneled through Win.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. The traffic did not go out simultaneously,
21 each section would have originated the cable and eventually
22 it would have gone to Scott, who would send the cable to
23 Washington?

24 Mr. White. That is right. Neither can one assume that
25 the cables went out in the same sequence that the events with
which they dealt occurred.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. To your knowledge was
2 Mr. Scott upset at the failure of the Mexico City station to
3 obtain a photograph of Oswald during his visit to Mexico
4 City?

5 Mr. White. Win was a very flegmatic fellow. He occa-
6 sionally blew his top but normally you didn't know when he
7 was upset by something. Sure, I think we were all concerned
8 that we didn't have any specific identifiable photograph of
9 Oswald. I cannot recall the specific reaction at the time,
10 but I am pretty sure that it would have had to do with our
11 inability to keep the camera going 24 hours a day, seven days
12 a week.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall if the coverage was modi-
14 fied after the assassination?

15 Mr. White. I don't recall that it was but it probably
16 was, for a while anyway. In fact it could have been even
17 before, I don't know, as a result of this Washington cable
18 that showed Washington was concerned.

19 It seems to me that the photographic circumstances were
20 rather bad. There was one guy and his wife who manned that
21 camera. They were in a little confined space. I can't
22 remember whether they had kids or not, a child. But there is
23 a question, it was partially a question of pressure on them,
24 too.
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1 Mr. Goldsmith. We could establish by reviewing the trans-
2 cript that Oswald visited the Embassies a total of at least
3 four times and possibly as many as six times. In fact the IGR
4 states he may have visited as many as six times.

5 Mr. White. What is IGR?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Inspector General's Report. Do you
7 think that it is unusual that Oswald having made six visits
8 to the Embassy would still manage to avoid being photographed?
9 In other words, the Station went 0 for 6 on Oswald.

10 Mr. White. You say that the transcript indicates that he
11 visited the Embassy as many as six times?

12 Mr. Goldsmith. We can go over the transcript piece by
13 piece and you would see that if you make the appropriate infer-
14 ences he went to the Embassy five times. For example, the con-
15 versation on September 27 between Oswald at the Cuban Embassy
16 and the Soviet Embassy, he says -- he is clearly at the Soviet
17 Embassy and he indicates "I was there," he clearly at the Cuban
18 Embassy says "I was there," at the Soviet Embassy earlier.
19 That is two days.

20 T he next day, the 28th, he is calling again from one
21 Embassy to another and he says "I will be right over. I was
22 there earlier and I am coming back again." There is three times.
23 We have five times in two days. My recollection is that the
24 Inspector General's report indicates he was there six times
25 although I don't know what basis they had for saying that. In

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1 any event if he was there five or six times -- my question
2 is not directed toward criticism of the Agency -- I am won-
3 dering in light of the fact he went there five or six times
4 that it is likely that a photograph was taken of him.

5 Mr. White. I think the answer to your first question is
6 yes, it would seem to be most unlikely that he could go there
7 five or six times and escape being photographed if he did it
8 during normal hours. Is there anything in the transcript that
9 would indicate that all these visits were during normal working
10 hours?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Three of the visits would have been on a
12 Saturday. One of the other visits would have been late in the
13 afternoon, Friday afternoon, about four o'clock. The earlier
14 one on Friday, you can't tell by looking at the transcript
15 what time he had been there.

16 Mr. White. Then we could possibly eliminate four of those
17 visits, three on Saturday and the one at four o'clock if the
18 Consulate was closed. I no longer remember what hours the
19 Consulate kept. I do remember that we were always in light
20 mood saying how great it would be to work for the Soviet
21 Embassy because they only seem to work about two hours a day.

22 So that would have left only once or maybe twice when
23 we should have gotten him and didn't. I just don't know.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA No. 197.
25 The reason for showing you this at this time is that this

1 reports Oswald's contact of 28 September, 1963. Is that
2 correct?

3 Mr. White. Yes. And this is 23 November. This had
4 previously been sent, had it not?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. No. This was the first time that that
6 was being sent.

7 Mr. White. Really?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. To headquarters.

9 Mr. White. What was the date of that last cable from
10 headquarters that said send everything?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. That was dated October 10 or 11.

12 Mr. White. It wasn't until the 23rd that this thing came?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. That is right.

14 Mr. White. Wow. I am sorry, your question was?

15 Mr. Goldsmith. My only question was this cable reports
16 the contact of September 28, 1963. Is that correct?

17 Mr. White. Yes. This is the one you asked me about before
18 with respect to paragraph 2?

19 Mr. Goldsmith. That is right.

20 In paragraph 2 it makes reference to Oswald's October 1st
21 contact, is that correct?

22 Mr. White. Yes.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us turn to CIA No. 202, which is a
24 cable. Would you read paragraph 6 of that cable.

25 Mr. White. Do you mind if I read the rest in order to

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1 get it in context?

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Sure.

3 Mr. White. Okay.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph 6 indicates "other than infor-
5 mation already sent re Oswald's connection with Soviet and
6 Cuban embassies no other information available." My question
7 is, it seems that the only information sent so far was on the
8 September 28 contact and the October 1 contact, and there were
9 two contacts on September 27. Do you know why headquarters
10 wasn't told about those other contacts at that time?

11 Mr. White. No, I don't. Somebody must have simply
12 overlooked them. I tell you the volume of paper that was being
13 handled by a small number of people just boggles the mind.
14 Win was a very fast reader and a couple of other people were.
15 But the processing of all this detailed paper was a terrible
16 time-consuming affair. I can only explain it that it must have
17 gotten lost in the furor of processing what was deemed to be
18 higher priority stuff. I was going to say did it not emerge
19 later that during this combing of all available materials that
20 they overlooked those two days?

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Later on headquarters was apprised of the
22 September 27 contact. Who sent out this cable?

23 Mr. White. Herb Manell and it was released by Win Scott.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Who is the authenticating officer?

25 Mr. White. That is CHG. That is Manell.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. What is above Manell?

2 Mr. White. Those are the initials GHG. It is G. H.
3 Gestetner. The same as G.H.G. here. But that Rybat is a
4 sensitive indicator. It was not at all unusual in cases
5 that were regarded as sensitive that the originating officer
6 would send them just to the Station Chief for release.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Please look at CIA No. 225.

8 Mr. White. Okay.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you write that cable?

10 Mr. White. I had to, I am sure.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. My question is, that cable indicates that
12 Oswald's only known contact was the 9-28 contact with the Cuban
13 Embassy?

14 Mr. White. Yes.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time you sent that cable were you
16 aware that Oswald had also visited the Soviet Embassy?

17 Mr. White. I was not. I clearly was not aware. I don't
18 even know why I wrote that, how I got into the business of
19 writing the cable. What day was the 23rd of November?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. It was a Saturday.

21 Mr. White. That may be why.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean, that may be why?

23 Mr. White. There was an outstanding requirement on
24 photos left over from the day before and somebody wasn't in
25 from the Soviet Section to bounce it off of.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying on that day you would
2 have checked with anyone that was available and perhaps the
3 Soviet people were not around?

4 Mr. White. That is what I am saying.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Wouldn't you think on the 23rd of Novem-
6 ber, the date after the President had been killed, everyone in
7 the Station would have been around?

8 Mr. White. Yes. It really doesn't make sense. As I
9 recall it was about noon, Mexico time, was it not?

10 Mr. Goldsmith. When what?

11 Mr. White. When he was killed. What time of the day?
12 I remember I was in the car ---

13 Mr. Goldsmith. He was killed at approximately 12:30
14 central standard time. I don't know how that relates to Mexican
15 time.

16 Mr. White. I think we were an hour off.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. This cable was sent the day after the
18 assassination.

19 Mr. White. The 23rd of November?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

21 Mr. White. In other words, why didn't I know what the
22 Station knew before this is what you are asking?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

24 Mr. White. I can't explain it. I can't explain it except
25 either I had not seen all the traffic -- I assume I should

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1 have before I wrote this.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination did the Mexico
3 City Station conduct an investigation into Oswald's activities
4 while he was in Mexico?

5 Mr. White. Yes, we had a continuously ongoing search of
6 files and all possible sources that we thought would contri-
7 bute.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Who was connected with the investigation
9 in Mexico City, the FBI or the CIA?

10 Mr. White. I had no knowledge of what the FBI was doing,
11 only what the Station was doing.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Station contact its sources?
13 Did it contact sources or assets to find out what Oswald's
14 visits with the Embassy may have been about?

15 Mr. White. We certainly contacted any sources that we
16 thought would have anything to contribute. The funny thing
17 about this cable is that there are no signatures on it. I
18 don't understand why it does not have any signatures on it.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Does the cable normally have signatures
20 on it?

21 Mr. White. Sure. I see, this was the headquarter's
22 copy.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. There is nothing unusual about the cable
24 itself?

25 Mr. White. No.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first realize that Oswald
2 had been to both embassies? Do you recall?

3 Mr. White. No, I do not. It must have been soon after
4 this though.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA investigate Sylvia Duran
6 after the assassination?

7 Mr. White. What do you mean by investigate Sylvia Duran?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you talk to any of her associates?
9 Did you interview her?

10 Mr. White. I can't remember who was in charge of the Cuban
11 Section at that time.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Dave Philipps.

13 Mr. White. It would have been someone in his shop who
14 would have done it if it had been done. I believe she was
15 interviewed.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. At one point the CIA headquarters cabled
17 the Station and indicated that headquarters did not want to have
18 Duran arrested by the Mexican. Do you know why that instruc-
19 tion would have been sent to the Station?

20 Mr. White. No, offhand I couldn't say.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any reason to believe that
22 Oswald may have been a KGB agent?

23 Mr. White. I have no reason to believe. You can always
24 speculate. I don't believe so. If he was he was a very poor
25 one the way he handled himself.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have reason to believe he worked
2 in some capacity for the CIA?

3 Mr. White. I have no reason to believe that.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the term CI/SIG stands
5 for?

6 Mr. White. Special Intelligence.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Of the Counterintelligence ---

8 Mr. White. --- staff.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the work of the CI/SIG unit?

10 Mr. White. I don't know. They had a couple of special
11 units. One of them dealt with very sensitive operations. The
12 CI Staff was strictly a paper-pushing outfit. They had one or
13 two branches or groups. SIG was one which did engage in actual
14 physical contact operations, agent operations.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been unusual for CI/SIG
16 to have been the group that opened up Oswald's 201 file?

17 Mr. White. Initially?

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

19 Mr. White. I can't answer that. I don't know what was
20 usual or unusual for them. The CI Staff was a highly unusual
21 outfit.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been standard CIA procedure
23 for an Agency employee to have interviewed or debriefed
24 Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union to the United
25 States?

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1 Mr. White. It depends on what was known about him at
2 the time. If he were a security suspect it would have been
3 unusual. The Bureau would have done it at our behest. The
4 Bureau would have done it routinely anyway. But if he were a
5 routine visitor to the Soviet Union we might have done it through
6 our Overt Division.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the distinction you would draw.
8 If Oswald had been a security suspect of some kind it would
9 have been the Bureau's job. If he were a visitor or a business-
10 man, then CIA may have done it?

11 Mr. White. Yes, but through one of its overt domestic
12 contacts.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. What is a 201 file?

14 Mr. White. A 201 file is a biographic file that contains
15 information about one person.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Would a 201 file indicate whether or not
17 a person was an agent, asset, source of the CIA?

18 Mr. White. Yes, most likely. But there were other kinds
19 of 201 files. The 201 file would not necessarily deal only
20 with people who were agents.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. What other kinds would there be?

22 Mr. White. Anyone on whom -- let us say we had liaison
23 with a German police formation. We would have 201 files
24 on the principal officers with whom we dealt. All the infor-
25 mation about that individual would go into that 201 file.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying then that the mere fact
2 that a 201 file exists does not necessarily mean that the per-
3 son for whom the file has been taken out was an asset, agent
4 or source of the Agency?

5 Mr. White. Yes, that is what I am saying.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Would a 201 file be opened on someone if
7 he were perceived as a counterintelligence threat?

8 Mr. White. It could be.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. If in fact someone were an agent for the
10 CIA would that automatically be noted in the 201 file?

11 Mr. White. Not necessarily. Actually it would be in
12 the 201 file, in the case of an agent would be a sort of bare
13 biographic data. All operations data would be in the opera-
14 tions file.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. It is possible that the 201 file would
16 indicate the Agency relationship but it is also possible that
17 it would not?

18 Mr. White. Yes. It would be kind of hard if a man were
19 an agent for there not to be some hint in there that he was.
20 It might not have specifics. A 201 file was really a file
21 designed to enable Agency namecheck procedures to be conducted
22 and be accurate but not necessarily reveal to unauthorized
23 members of the Agency that there was an operational relation-
24 ship with that person. Am I making the distinction clear?

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, I understand.

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1 If you wanted to find out what operations that a par-
2 ticular agent had been involved in how would you go about get-
3 ting that information?

4 Mr. White. The agent has a cryptonym. The cryptonyms
5 in a case file would be broken down into four parts. The
6 first part of which is the biographic information. That would
7 be the 201. The second part would be the administrative
8 information. The third part would be operations and the
9 fourth part would be production. In part three there would
10 ordinarily be a monthly progress report or at least a quarterly
11 progress report on that operation would be summarized in that.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. For each agent there would be an opera-
13 tional file you could turn to?

14 Mr. White. That is right.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. You would not have to know the name of
16 every operation that the agent was involved in in advance and
17 go to that particular operations file? You could just go to
18 the operations file for that particular agent and it would
19 list the information.

20 Mr. White. It should list all the cryptonyms and all the
21 operations he was involved in.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you certain of that.

23 Mr. White. I am certain that is the way it was meant to
24 be. I am certain it was not always done that way.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine procedure that is
the way it is done?

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1 Mr. White. Or was done.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. You left in 1976?

3 Mr. White. I left operations in '70.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. What did you do between '70 and '76?

5 Mr. White. I was in training and I was head of the Anti-
6 terrorist Group.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Agency ever con-
8 sidered recruiting Oswald?

9 Mr. White. No, I certain do not.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Oswald had any contact
11 with Agency personnel while he was in the Soviet Union?

12 Mr. White. I do not know that either.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever interviewed by anyone from
14 the Inspector General's office concerning the surveillance
15 operations in Mexico City?

16 Mr. White. When?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. During 1963. Let me rephrase the ques-
18 tion. Were you ever interviewed by anyone from the Inspector
19 General's office concerning the surveillance operations in
20 Mexico City during the time that Oswald was there?

21 Mr. White. Not to the best of my recollection.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever been interviewed by the
23 Inspector General's Office in regard to any matter?

24 Mr. White. Oh, yes. Sure, they used to make routine
25 inspections of Stations and so forth and I am sure I have been.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. If they had asked you questions about
2 Oswald in Mexico City would you have remembered that?

3 Mr. White. Gee, I don't know. That is a kind of funny
4 question. If they asked me questions would I remember?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. The re-son I ask is that your answer to
6 my question was "no, not to the best of my recollection." I
7 guess I am looking for a more definite answer.

8 Mr. White. I would like to be able to give it to you.
9 If they did interview me it must be a matter of record. I
10 would rather say I can't remember than make a stab at it and
11 give you a wrong answer because your work must be difficult
12 enough without trying to get people to back up on statements
13 they have already made "well, it says here in the record."

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever know a CIA officer named
15 Maurice Bishop?

16 Mr. White. Is that his real name?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I don't know.

18 Mr. White. I don't think I ever knew anyone under
19 that name.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Dave Philipps ever
21 used that as an operational alias?

22 Mr. White. I don't know if he ever did or not.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever use any operational aliases?

24 Mr. White. Yes.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. How many would you use?

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Mr. White. As few as possible because you can trip yourself up that way very easily.

Mr. Goldsmith. It would be very unusual for a case officer over a period of years let us say to have used hundreds of operational aliases?

Mr. White. Hundreds? I would term it most unusual.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the reason you stated, it would be tough to remember which one you used with whom?

Mr. White. Exactly.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your opinion as to the manner in which the Agency handled the Oswald case prior to the assassination?

Mr. White. Prior to the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. White. From what I knew about it I would say they handled it in about the way that was to be expected, gave it about the degree of importance that it merited.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did headquarters ever criticize the Agency for not having a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. White. The Station?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. White. They may have. That really would have been the spilt milk department wouldn't it? So it would not have made much sense to use the communications channel for that. I would have expected, if it were a criticism, if it did come

1 as a criticism, to come more in a personal letter to Win or
2 during one of his visits to Washington.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Would he have told you about that?

4 Mr. White. He might have. He might not have. He was
5 a strange guy.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall one way or another whether
7 headquarters ever did criticize the Station?

8 Mr. White. I don't remember any criticism for that.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What is your opinion of the manner in
10 which the Station conducted itself after the assassination?

11 Mr. White. Everybody was flat out, I tell ylu that, doing
12 whatever it was he was doing to take care of his part of the
13 affair. Whatever role had been assigned him to play, every-
14 body was doing it without any regard to hours of work or
15 anything else. That went on for a number of weeks. The
16 recollection that I retain is one of continuously grinding out
17 the same material over and over again saying it in different
18 ways. I can honestly say that I have never, since leaving the
19 Mexico City Station, reread any of those files until this materia
20 I have seen today.

21 A lot of stuff has been superimposed on my memory of those
22 events. The principal fact that concerned me was that, yes,
23 we did get transcripts of Oswald's telephone calls and, no,
24 we did not isolate a photograph of him and that was a damn
25 shame, but I personally can't fault anybody in the Station

1 for what he did or didn't do with respect to that investi-
2 gation.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you or anyone else at the Station
4 have knowledge of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots?

5 Mr. White. No. I can only speak for myself. I don't
6 know what knowledge other people had. It was not discussed
7 with me.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. White, I would like to thank you
9 very much for being here today. You have been very patient.
10 You have been generous with your time. Customarily the com-
11 mittee gives the witness who appears before us at a hearing
12 the opportunity to make a statement. Although this is not
13 a hearing if you would like to make a statement at this time,
14 feel free.

15 Mr. White. I don't have any statement I would like to
16 make on the record. Let me say that I apologize for my faulty
17 memory. I wish it weren't that way but it always has been.
18 It must be frustrating for you. Perhaps I am not the first bad
19 memory you have encountered.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you. Let me state the entire record
21 of this deposition will be transcribed. You will be given an
22 opportunity to review it, will be asked to sign it and to
23 verify it. The court reporter will be requested to certify
24 that the transcript is a complete, accurate and true record
25 of all the testimony given.

Mr. White. So you will want me down here again?

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, simply to read through the testi-
2 mony. We will do whatever we can to accommodate you in terms of
3 your time constraints.

4 Mr. White. All right.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. You could waive that if you want to but
6 I would want to put it on the record.

7 Mr. White. I won't have any chance to amend anything?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. You won't have an opportunity to amend.
9 You will have an opportunity to correct. However, if upon
10 reviewing the deposition you would like to make an additional
11 statement I would certainly give you that opportunity.

12 Mr. White. It might not be a bad idea. Inevitably I am
13 going to be thinking now about what we have been talking about.
14 It is possible that there might be some more light along the
15 line.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't you get in touch with us when the
17 transcript is completed?

18 Mr. White. All right.

19 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the taking of the deposition
20 was concluded.
21
22
23
24
25

1
2 I have read the foregoing pages
3 1 through 58, inclusive, which
4 contain a correct transcript of
5 the answers made by me to the
6 questions therein recorded.

7 Signature is subject to
8 corrections.

9
10 _____
(Deponent's signature)

11 I, _____, Notary Public in and for the
12 District of Columbia, do hereby certify that I am notarizing
13 and witnessing signature for the Deposition of Mr. Alan B.
14 White on this _____ day of _____.

15
16 _____
17 Notary Public in and for the
18 District of Columbia
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Alfred Joseph LaFrance, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in shorthand to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Notary Public in and for
the District of Columbia

My Commission expires November 14, 1980.

is ended

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